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Abstract
Many mechanisms have been designed to solve the free-rider problem in public good
environments. The designers of those mechanisms focused on good static equilibrium
properties. In this paper, I propose a new mechanism for the provision of public goods
that has good dynamic properties instead. The mechanism gives all agents the possi-
bility to condition their contribution on the total level of contribution provided by all
agents. Under a reasonable variant of Better Response Dynamics all equilibrium out-
comes are Pareto eﬃcient. This makes the mechanism particularly suited for repeated
public good environments. In contrast to many previously suggested mechanisms, it does
further not require an institution that has the power to enforce participation and/or
transfer payments. Neither does it use any knowledge of agents preferences.
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1 Introduction
Numerous mechanisms have been developed in an attempt to solve the free-rider problem in
public good scenarios. All those mechanisms were developed with a static solution concept
in mind. However, Healy (2006) shows that in repeated public good environments agents'
actions can be well described by a dynamic better response behavior. This paper therefore
presents a new mechanism that achieves eﬃcient contribution levels under an adjusted bet-
ter response dynamic. This mechanism is called the Conditional Contribution Mechanism
(CCM).
In the CCM agents can free-ride and contribute unconditionally as in the Voluntary Con-
tribution Mechanism. Moreover, agents have the possibility to conditionally contribute. In
the most simple environment contribution is binary and agents' utility from the public good
increases linearly with the level of the public good. In this environment an oﬀer of conditional
contribution has the form I am willing to contribute, if at least k agents contribute in total.
The mechanism then chooses the highest possible level of total contribution that satisﬁes all
those conditions.
Under Better Response Dynamics agents switch only to messages with positive probability
that make them weakly better oﬀ if nobody else switches as well. In the proposed mechanism
all agents are indiﬀerent between many of their messages. Thus, Better Response Dynamics
are not suﬃciently restrictive for the dynamic process to converge to any equilibria.
However, the conditional contribution structure of the mechanism makes some better
responses more plausible than others in the long term. Once a certain level of contributions
is reached, messages can be separated in two sets. Under the messages in one set other agents
can change the outcome such that the ﬁrst agent is worse oﬀ, but still has to contribute to
the public good. The second set of messages makes sure that in all outcomes in which the
ﬁrst agent has to contribute he is at least as well oﬀ as he is in the current outcome.
The ﬁrst kind of messages, which increase other agents incentives to free-ride, shall be
called exploitable. The second kind shall be called unexploitable. The solution concept used
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in this paper, Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics, assumes that in the long run agents
only choose strategies which are better responses and not exploitable.
The central result of the binary model is that an outcome is an equilibrium outcome of
the proposed mechanism under Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics if and only if it is
Pareto optimal and a strict Pareto improvement over the outcome with zero contribution.
The remaining parts of the paper generalize the environment. First, contributions can
now be non-binary. Here the mechanism needs to be adjusted. However, the general idea
of oﬀering agents the options to free-ride, conditionally contribute, and unconditionally con-
tribute remains unchanged. In this environment the equilibrium results mirror the results
for binary contribution.
Second, the environment is generalized to cover weakly monotonic increasing instead of
linear valuation functions. In this case Pareto optimality will not be enough to ensure
that an outcome is part of a recurrent class. Since utility gained from the public good
no longer increases linearly with the contribution towards the public good, there might now
be coalitions of agents who beneﬁt from reducing their own contributions even if all other
agents then contribute nothing any more. In this environment an outcome is an outcome of
a recurrent class of the mechanism under Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics if and
only if it is in the core and any deviation of a coalition from this outcome makes at least
one agent in that coalition strictly worse oﬀ. This holds if at least one such outcome exists.
Existence can be guaranteed by adding only inﬁnitesimal monetary incentives.
1.1 Related literature
This work relates in particular to three branches of the literature. The ﬁrst one is given by
work on mechanisms to increase contributions to public goods. The earliest work dates back
to Lindahl (1919). However, his pricing system turned out to be not incentive compatible.
The most prominent incentive compatible mechanisms were then designed by Clarke (1971)
and Groves and Ledyard (1977). More recent advances are the Jackson-Moulin mechanism
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(Jackson and Moulin, 1992) or the Falkinger mechanism (Falkinger et al., 2000). However,
all those mechanisms have their own draw-backs. Some e.g. require participation to be
enforceable, or a high level of information about other agents' preferences to reach the desired
equilibrium.
Second, there are experimental studies on public good provision. For a general survey I
refer to Ledyard (1994), or the more recent surveys of Chen (2008) and Chaudhuri (2011).
Two smaller branches of this literature support the idea that the CCM should be successful.
First, the studies of Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Kocher et al. (2008) show that some
agents have strict preferences for conditional cooperation. I do not use this fact in the
equilibrium analysis. However, it is obvious that preferences for conditional cooperation
make it more likely that agents choose to conditional contribution instead of free-riding.
Second, there are certain papers that compare the performance of the Voluntary Contri-
bution Mechanism (VCM) experimentally to the performance of other simple public good
mechanisms. Two mechanisms have been found to be able to increase contributions at least
in some situations. The auction mechanism by Smith (1979, 1980) and the Provision Point
Mechanism (PPM) studied e.g. in Rondeau et al. (1999, 2005). Those mechanisms have in
common that they use a sharp discontinuity to prevent the incentives of free-riding. The
CCM shares this property of a sharp discontinuity.
In the PPM and the auction mechanism the value of this discontinuity has to be chosen
by the mechanism designer. With a lack of knowledge of agents' preferences this can lead
to failure of the mechanism to provide any contributions. In the CCM the value of the
discontinuity depends on agents' messages. Thus, it is no longer exogenously ﬁxed but can
dynamically adjust itself to the optimal value.
The third branch of the literature focuses on Better Response Dynamics in mechanisms. I
already mentioned that Healy (2006) provides experimental evidence that agents' behavior in
public good mechanisms can be well described by a better response model. The importance
of Better Response Dynamics in mechanisms is further highlighted by the recent introduction
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of Better Response Dynamics into the implementation literature by Cabrales and Serrano
(2011).
1.2 Plan of the paper
The remaining sections are structured as follows. In section 2, I introduce the Binary Con-
ditional Contribution Mechanism (BCCM) in the simplest possible setting. Valuations are
linear and contribution to the public good is binary. Section 3 introduces Unexploitable
Better Response Dynamics and the outcomes of recurrent classes of the BCCM under UBRD
are calculated. Section 4 removes the assumption that contributions are binary and intro-
duces the (non-binary) Conditional Contribution Mechanism. In Section 5, the assumption
of linear valuations is replaced with the weaker assumption of weakly increasing valuation
functions. Section 6 provides a summary and discussion of the results. Proofs of all theorems
can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism
I consider a public good environment in the following form. All n ∈ N agents labeled i are
considered to have one monetary unit available in each period, which they can either keep
or invest in one unit of the public good. An outcome is then deﬁned as z = (z1, ..., zn) with
zi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I := {1, . . . , n}, where zi = 1 is interpreted as agent i investing his monetary
unit into the public good and zi = 0 represents agent i keeping his monetary unit for himself.
For notational convenience deﬁne z = (0, . . . , 0).
Further, all agents i ∈ I have a valuation θi ∈ [0, 1) for the public good.1 Utility of agent
1Values θi < 0 are excluded, since then the public good would be a bad for those agents. If this were
the case a mechanism that does not use transfers can never guarantee Pareto improvements. Thus, the
mechanism proposed in this paper should only be applied if valuations of the public good of all agents are
weakly positive. Values θi ≥ 1 are excluded for simplicity of notation. Any agent with θi ≥ 1 has a weakly
dominant strategy to contribute the entire endowment to the public good. Thus, there is no need to provide
additional incentives to this kind of agents. Therefore, including the possibility of θi ≥ 1 would not lead to
a signiﬁcant change in any results of the paper, but would complicate notation at several points.
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i is then given by a quasilinear utility function of the form
ui = 1− zi + θi
n∑
j=1
zj. (1)
Valuations θi are further assumed to be such that some outcome z exists, which is a strict
Pareto improvement over z for all agents i, who contribute in z. This assumption ensures
that some strict improvement over z is possible.2
We do not make any speciﬁc assumption on whether agents are informed on the valuations
of other agents or not. Nash equilibrium is considered only as a ﬁrst predictor of possible
dynamically stable outcomes and the main solution concept is a dynamic adjustment process.
Therefore, the results of this paper apply whenever this adjustment process describes behav-
ior reasonably well. This might be the case in environments with complete or incomplete
information.
2.1 The mechanism
In the Binary Conditional Contribution MechanismGBCCM := (MBCCM , gBCCM) every agent
can choose a natural number between 1 and n + 1. Thus the message space is deﬁned as
MBCCM =
∏n
i=1M
BCCM
i , with M
BCCM
i := {1, 2, . . . , n + 1}, ∀i ∈ I. The chosen message is
thereby interpreted in the following way: Choosing message mi = k is like saying I'm willing
to contribute to the public good if at least k agents (including myself) contribute in total.
Note that with the messages mi = 1 and mi = n+ 1 players can decide to contribute in any
or no case, respectively.3
The outcome selected by the mechanism is the outcome with the highest possible level of
2If this were not the case, any Pareto improvement would rely on some agent's contribution, who is
indiﬀerent between this Pareto improvement and z. No mechanism with the desired properties can be asked
to provide strict incentives to contribute for this agent in such an environment. Thus, such cases are not
considered in the equilibrium analysis.
3Since there are only n agents, there can never be n+ 1 contributing agents.
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contributions such that all those statements are satisﬁed. Formally, deﬁne
K(m) := max
{
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}
∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
1(mi≤k) ≥ k
}
. (2)
The outcome of the mechanism is deﬁned as gBCCM(m) = z with zi = 1 if and only if
mi ≤ K(m).4
2.2 Nash equilibria of the BCCM
The BCCM has multiple Nash equilibria. An example shall demonstrate what properties an
outcome must have to be a Nash equilibrium outcome.
Example 2.1 Consider 5 identical agents with valuation θi = 0.4 ∀ i ∈ I. The trivial
Nash equilibrium is given by mi = 6, ∀ i ∈ I, where no agent contributes to the public good.
However, there are more equilibria as e.g. when agents 1, 2 and 3 choose message mi = 3 and
agents 4 and 5 choose mi = 6. In this case the ﬁrst three agents will contribute to the public
good: z = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0). The structure of the mechanism makes this an equilibrium. Agents
4 or 5 can only change the outcome to z′ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0) or z′′ = (1, 1, 1, 0, 1) respectively
by unilateral deviation. Neither deviation is beneﬁcial. And the ﬁrst three agents can only
change the outcome to z, which is not beneﬁcial either. Thus, no agent has any incentive do
deviate.
The incentive structure in the example can be generalized. For any outcome there is a
message proﬁle that limits the options of agents to the following ones: Agents that currently
do not contribute can only alter the outcome by unilaterally contributing themselves, which
makes them worse oﬀ. Agents that currently contribute can only change the outcome to z.
This indicates that a certain outcome can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium if and only
if there is no agent for which the deviation to z is proﬁtable.
4In equation (2) 1(mi≤k) denotes the indicator function, which is 1 if mi ≤ k and 0 otherwise.
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Theorem 2.2 z is the outcome of a Nash-equilibrium of the BCCM if and only if
z i z, ∀ i ∈ I.
Theorem 2.2 predicts equilibria which are Pareto eﬃcient as well as equilibria which may
not be Pareto eﬃcient such as those equilibria with outcome z. Thus, the Nash equilibrium
concept does not make a clear prediction as to the equilibrium outcome of the mechanism.
Nor does it predict the eﬃciency of equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, a suitable reﬁnement
of the Nash equilibrium concept is needed.
3 Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics
As mentioned in the introduction, Better Response Dynamics have been found to describe
agents' behavior in repeated public good games rather well (Healy, 2006). Thus, the focus
of this section is on Better Response Dynamics as a solution concept. In the following
I demonstrate why simple Better Response Dynamics can not be used for the proposed
mechanisms. And I motivate a variant of Better Response Dynamics that will be used
instead. The intention of this concept is not to perfectly describe subject behavior. The
purpose is rather to deﬁne a dynamic concept that captures all incentives relevant in the
long term. The aim is to correctly predict the set of long term stable outcomes.
Better Response Dynamics assume that a mechanism is played repeatedly by the same
agents over a ﬁnite or inﬁnite number of periods t. In any period one or more agents are
allowed to adjust their message. Agents deviate with positive probability from their current
message mti to any message m
t+1
i that is a better or best response to m
t. A recurrent class of
such a dynamic concept is a set of message proﬁles, which if ever reached by the dynamics is
never left and which contains no smaller set with the same property. If such a recurrent class
consists of a single message proﬁle it is called an absorbing state. The equilibrium outcomes
of Better Response Dynamics are deﬁned as all outcomes of their recurrent classes.
However, when mt−i (the message proﬁle containing the messages of all players but i) is
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ﬁxed, all messages in the BCCM of agent i will lead to only two possible outcomes. This
implies that agents will myopically be indiﬀerent between most of their messages. A dynamic
adjustment process that only considers myopic better or best response behavior will then have
the entire strategy space as its only recurrent class. Thus, simple Better Response Dynamics
are not restrictive enough as a solution concept.
I propose to combine the myopic better response condition with a second condition on
behavior that is less myopic. Consider the following example.
Example 3.1 Assume there are 5 identical agents all with type θi = 0.4. Assume that
currently 4 agents contribute to the public good. The message proﬁle could e.g. be mt =
(4, 4, 3, 3, 6). In this case agents 1 through 4 contribute to the public good. Consider now
agent 1. Any message mt+1i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is a better response for agent i to the message proﬁle
mt. None of those messages would change the outcome if no other agent changes his message
at the same time. However, the message mt+11 = 3 gives agent 2 an incentive to deviate to
mt+22 = 6 in the following period. Under the new message proﬁle m
t+2 = (3, 6, 3, 3, 6) only
agents 1, 3 and 4 would contribute to the public good making those agents worse and agent
2 better oﬀ. The same would be true for the messages mt+11 = 2 and m
t+1
1 = 1. Messages
mt+11 ∈ {1, 2, 3} can thus be exploited by agent 2 in a later period, making agent 2 better oﬀ
and agent 1 worse oﬀ. The special structure of the mechanism makes it possible for agents
to prevent this kind of incentives for exploitation without having to free-ride themselves.
From a strategic perspective the exploitable messages in the example provide other agents
with incentives to deviate to less cooperative messages. Thus, not choosing those messages
can be interpreted like a second order better response behavior. Agents assume that other
agents better respond to the message proﬁle and choose of their own better responses the
ones that are strategically optimal. There are more arguments that rationalize this behavior.
It is easier, however, to provide those arguments once the term exploitable and with it
Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics are precisely deﬁned.
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Deﬁnition 3.2 Given a message proﬁle m and an outcome g(m) = z, a deviation from
mi to m
′
i is called exploitable if there is m−i ∈ M−i such that z′(m−i) := g(m′i,m−i) ≺i
z and z′i(m−i) > 0. A message m
′
i is called unexploitable if it is not exploitable.
In the following the assumptions of better responding and unexploitability are combined to
one behavioral model.5
Deﬁnition 3.3 In Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics (UBRD) all agents can adjust
their message in every period. Agent i switches in period t to message mti with strictly positive
probability if and only if
• mti is a (weak) better response to mt−1 and
• mti is unexploitable with respect to zt−1 := gBCCM(mt−1).
Revisit the example from above with this deﬁnition in mind.
Example 3.4 Assume there are 5 identical agents all with type θi = 0.4. Let the current
message proﬁle be m = (6, 6, 6, 6, 6). In this case no agent contributes and the outcome is
z. Therefore, a message is exploitable in this case if it makes outcomes possible in which an
agent is worse oﬀ than in z. Those messages are only mi = 1 and mi = 2. Both messages are
weakly dominated by mi = 3. Thus, when the current outcome is z a message is exploitable
if and only if it is weakly dominated.
Therefore, unexploitability can be summarized by two assumptions. First, if agents did not
yet coordinate on any Pareto improvements, agents do not send weakly dominated messages.
Second, once agents coordinated on a positive level of contributions, they do not choose
messages that set incentives for other agents to free-ride on their contribution.
Furthermore, it is not necessary that all agents behave in an unexploitable way. If a
large enough subgroup of agents behaves according to UBRD, while the rest of the agents is
5Such a model must further specify whether only one or all agents can change their message in a given
period. The latter seems more reasonable for most applications (e.g. international environmental agreements).
Thus, I assume in the analysis that all agents can adjust their message every period.
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just better responding, the equilibrium outcomes will be as eﬃcient as if all agents behaved
according to UBRD. Consider again an example.
Example 3.5 Assume there are 5 identical agents all with type θi = 0.4. Let the current
message proﬁle bem = (5, 5, 5, 1, 1). In this case only agents 1 through 3 send an unexploitable
message. Nevertheless, neither of the agents can strictly beneﬁt from any deviation. Although
agent 4 and 5's messages are exploitable any attempt to exploit those agents would leave only
agents 4 and 5 contributing. Thus, total contribution to the public good would go down by
3. This makes all agents worse oﬀ. Thus, in this example it is suﬃcient if 60% of agents
behave according to UBRD to support full cooperation.
3.1 Equilibrium properties of the BCCM under UBRD
Under the stated assumptions agents will learn over time not to choose messages which make
them worse oﬀ. And they will learn to choose messages that prevent other agents from
exploiting their contribution oﬀers. Under the combination of those two assumptions an
outcome is stable if and only if it is Pareto optimal and no agent would be equally well or
better oﬀ in z. The rest of the paper uses the following deﬁnition to simplify notation.
Deﬁnition 3.6 z′ is a strict∗ Pareto improvement over z if z′ is a Pareto improvement over
z, that is strict for all agents with type θi 6= 0. 6
With this deﬁnition I can prove the central result for the binary model.
Theorem 3.7 An outcome z ∈ Z is an outcome of some recurrent class of the BCCM under
UBRD if and only if it is a Pareto optimal outcome and a strict∗ Pareto improvement over
z.
6Agents who do not proﬁt from the public good (θi = 0) can never be strictly better oﬀ than in z. If
those agents are excluded this deﬁnition of strict∗ is not necessary. However, the existence of agents with
a valuation of θi = 0 makes many mechanisms, which try to force agents to cooperate, to lead to outcomes
that are not individually rational. It is thus important to include this case to demonstrate that the BCCM
can handle it.
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Let me again provide an example to improve the intuition for this result:
Example 3.8 Consider a case with 5 identical agents all with type θi = 0.4. The theorem
predicts that all outcomes in which 3,4, or 5 agents contribute to the public good are outcomes
of recurrent classes of the BCCM. Those outcomes have in common that they are Pareto
eﬃcient in a non-transferable utility setting. Assume for example that the current message
proﬁle is m = (4, 4, 4, 4, 6). Then agents 1 through 4 contribute to the public good, while
agent 5 does not. Thus, the outcome is z = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0). Any deviation of agent 5 would
lead to z′ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and would thus not be a better response. For agents 1 through 4
messages mi ∈ {5, 6} would lead to the outcome z. They are thus not better responses either.
Messages mi ∈ {1, 2, 3} however make outcomes possible in which the agent has to contribute,
but total contribution is less than 4. Thus, those messages are exploitable. Therefore, the
given message proﬁle is a steady state of UBRD.7
4 Non-binary Conditional Contribution Mechanisms
The environment can be generalized to a setting in which contribution is not binary, while
keeping the mechanism similar. Assume that every agent can invest any amount between 0
and 1 into the public good. Because it is closer to reality and it keeps the dynamic analysis
simpler, I assume a smallest indivisible monetary unit of 0.01.8
The BCCM can be adjusted to this environment in a very natural way. However, this
natural extension turns out to have equilibria under dynamic considerations, which are not
Pareto optimal. Nevertheless, this failure of the natural extension is an important motivation
for the more complex message space of the Conditional Contribution Mechanism, which will
be introduced afterwards.
7In this example the other steady states are given by m′ = (5, 5, 5, 5, 5) and m′′ = (3, 3, 3, 6, 6) (in any
permutation)
8This discretization resembles the money structure in most countries. All results in the paper hold with
any other ﬁnite discretization as well as with diﬀerent levels of income.
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4.1 The Natural Extension Mechanism
The natural extension of the BCCM will assign every agent i the message space MNEMi :=
{0, 0.01, . . . , 0.99, 1} × {0, 0.01, . . . , n − 0.01, n}, where mi = (αi, βi) is interpreted as I am
willing to contribute αi to the public good if total contribution is at least βi. For the analysis
in this section I refer to this mechanism as the Natural Extension Mechanism (NEM). The
outcome space is then given by Z := {0, 0.01, . . . , 0.99, 1}n, where zi is the contribution of
agent i to the public good in outcome z. z := (0, . . . , 0) is used as before as the outcome
with no contribution to the public good by anyone. The level of contribution selected by
the mechanism is again the highest level of total contribution such that all conditions are
satisﬁed. Formally, let ZNEM(m) ⊂ Z be the set of all outcomes that satisfy all conditions
in m. This can be formalized by
z ∈ ZNEM(m)⇔
(
zi = 0 or zi = αi and
n∑
j=1
zj ≥ βi
)
, ∀ i ∈ I. (3)
It is easy to see that z ∈ ZNEM(m) and z′ ∈ ZNEM(m) imply together
z′′ = (max{z1, z′1}, . . . ,max{zn, z′n}) ∈ ZNEM(m). Thus, the outcome of the mechanism is
uniquely deﬁned by
gNEM(m) = argmaxz∈ZNEM (m)
n∑
i=1
zi. (4)
The structure of Nash equilibria is similar to the binary case:
Theorem 4.1 An outcome z is an outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the NEM if and only
if z i z, ∀ i ∈ I.
Revisit the example
Example 4.2 Each of ﬁve agents has type θi = 0.4. Assume z = (0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1). Then
z i z ∀ i ∈ I. This outcome is the outcome of the Nash equilibrium given by mi = (zi, 1.5).
This is a Nash equilibrium since no agent can reduce his contribution without the outcome
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becoming z. And neither can any agent by changing his message increase any other agent's
contribution. Thus, the options for unilateral deviations can be reduced to the same cases as
in the binary model.
Unfortunately, the NEM has undesirable equilibria under UBRD as well. The simplest way
to show this is by considering an example.
Example 4.3 Assume again each of ﬁve agents has type θi = 0.4. Assume further that in
period t all agents sent message mti = (0.1, 0.5) and z
t = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1). Let us ﬁnd
all unexploitable better responses in period t + 1. Consider w.l.o.g agent 1. Any message
m′1 = (α1, β1) with α1 < 0.1 and β1 > α1 will lead to z and is thus not a better response. Any
message m′1 = (α1, β1) with α1 < 0.1 and β1 ≤ α1 will lead to z = (α1, 0, 0, 0, 0) and is thus
not a better response, either. Any message m′1 = (α1, β1) with α1 > 0.1 and β1 > 0.4 + α1
will lead to z and is thus not a better response. Any message m′1 = (α1, β1) with α1 > 0.1 and
β1 ≤ 0.4 + α1 will lead to z = (α1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1) and is thus not a better response, either.
This leaves only messages with α1 = 0.1. However of those messages the ones with β1 > 0.5
lead to z and are not a better response and the ones with β1 < 0.5 are exploitable. β1 = 0.3
e.g. could lead after deviations of the other agents to m′j = (0.05, 0.3), ∀j ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} to
z′ = (0.1, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05). In this outcome agent 1 is worse oﬀ than in zt but contributes
a strictly positive amount. Thus, his message was exploitable. The only unexploitable better
response is thus m′1 = (0.1, 0.5). This implies that message proﬁle m
t is an absorbing state
of UBRD. However, zt = (0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1) is not Pareto optimal.
Agents can in this way get stuck on Pareto improvements over z which are not Pareto
optimal. Any deviation aiming to make further Pareto improvements possible would make
the deviating agent worse oﬀ in the next period. And such a deviation is infeasible under a
better response behavior.
This problem can be solved by letting agents announce more than one tuple of the form
(αi, βi). This grants agents a higher ﬂexibility in their strategy giving them the opportunity
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to explore Pareto improvements with some tuples, while securing the current level of coop-
eration with one other tuple. As it turns out a message of two such tuples is already enough
to solve the issue. Simplicity is a further desirable feature of mechanisms once practical
implementations are considered. Thus, the mechanism I propose in the following paragraph
lets agents announce exactly two tuples.9
4.2 The Conditional Contribution Mechanism
I call this mechanism the Conditional Contribution Mechanism GCCM := (MCCM , gCCM).
Every agent can announce two tuples {(α1i , β1i ), (α2i , β2i )} ∈MCCMi := MNEMi ×MNEMi . The
outcome gCCM(m) of the CCM is then deﬁned as in the NEM as the outcome with the highest
level of contribution consistent with the messages chosen. Let ZCCM(m) ⊂ Z be the set of
feasible outcomes for a message proﬁle m:
z ∈ ZCCM(m)⇔ zi = 0 or
{
∃li ∈ {1, 2} : zi = αlii and
n∑
j=1
zj ≥ βlii
}
, ∀ i ∈ I (5)
The outcome of the CCM is then uniquely deﬁned by
gCCM(m) = argmaxz∈ZCCM (m)
n∑
i=1
zi.
10 (6)
The additional tuple in the message has no eﬀect on Nash equilibrium outcomes, since only
one of the two announced tuples per agent is responsible for the outcome. Such a mechanism
9Depending on the application diﬀerent versions of the mechanism are possible. The more tuples agents
can send, the more ﬂexible they are. Thus, more tuples could lead to faster convergence. However, more
tuples also make the mechanism more complicated. Therefore, a reasonable version for applications might
be to let agents announce any amount of tuples they choose between one and some upper bound. This gives
agents the simple option of choosing one tuple, while also giving them the option to choose very detailed
messages. This mechanism is from the theoretical perspective identical to the version in the paper. The
paper version is chosen since it simpliﬁes notation, especially in proofs.
10The outcome can easily be computed by translating the messages of all agents into step-functions, adding
them up and taking the highest ﬁxed point of the resulting function. This makes sure that there is no problem
in computation, when n is large.
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can thus only be found and argued for, when dynamic properties are taken into consideration.
The CCM has indeed the desired positive dynamic properties:
Theorem 4.4 An outcome z ∈ Z is an outcome of some recurrent class of the CCM under
UBRD if and only if it is a Pareto optimal allocation and a strict∗ Pareto improvement over
z.
An example shall provide some intuition for this result.
Example 4.5 Consider the example with 5 agents. Each agent has type θi = 0.4. Then
in all outcomes of recurrent classes 3 agents contribute their entire endowment. The two
other agents can contribute any amount. Take for example the outcome z = (1, 1, 1, 0.5, 0.5).
This outcome is supported by the messages mi = {(1, 4), (1, 4)} for i = 1, 2, 3 and mi =
{(0.5, 4), (0.5, 4)} for i = 4, 5. The combination of unexploitability and better responding
behavior makes sure that the outcome cannot be left to another outcome with lower contri-
butions and the unexploitability condition implies further that the outcome cannot be left to
any outcome with higher contributions since either agent 4 or 5 would be worse oﬀ than
in z. Consider for example the message m′4 = {(0.5, 4), (1, 5)}. This deviation in it-
self does not change the outcome, thus it is a better response. However if agent 5 also
switches to m′5 = {(0.5, 4), (1, 5)}, the outcome would change to z′ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1). Since
u4/5(z) = 2.1 > 2.0 = u4/5(z
′) the messages m′4 and m
′
5 are exploitable.
11
5 Non-linear valuation functions
In this section I drop the assumption that valuations are linear and replace it by a weaker as-
sumption. Consider a ﬁnite number n of agents with quasi-linear utility functions ui(wi, wp) =
wi + fi(wp), where wi is the private wealth of agent i and wp is the total amount of wealth
11Agents 1 through 3 did not actively exploit the messages of agents 4 and 5 in this example. In some
sense these agents exploited each other. However, the important point is that the deviation from z to z′ is
not desirable for agents 4 and 5.
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invested into the public good by all agents. The functions fi are only assumed to be weakly
increasing in the level of the public good and may diﬀer across agents.12 Endowment and
outcome space Z := {0, 0.01, . . . , 1}n remain unchanged.13
In this setting Pareto optimality will not be enough to ensure that an outcome is part of
a recurrent class. Utility gained from the public good increases no longer linearly with the
contribution towards the public good. Therefore, there might now be groups of agents who
beneﬁt from reducing their own contributions even if all other agents would not contribute
anything any more.
In the proofs, I use that the options for deviations of coalitions can be limited to outcomes
in which no agent outside the coalition contributes. I call such outcomes enforceable, since
coalitions cannot force other agents to contribute. When coalitions' options for deviations are
limited to their enforceable outcomes, the equilibrium outcomes of the CCM under UBRD
can be captured by the core.
Deﬁnition 5.1 An outcome z ∈ Z is enforceable for a coalition S ⊂ I if zi = 0 ∀i /∈ S. The
set of all enforceable outcomes for coalition S shall be denoted ZS
As in the case of Pareto eﬃciency I use a standard deﬁnition of the core for games without
transferable utility as e.g. in (Owen, 1982, p. 293).
Deﬁnition 5.2 An outcome z ∈ Z is in the core if there is no S ⊂ I, S 6= ∅, and z′ ∈ ZS,
such that z′ i z, ∀ i ∈ S.
Since I already demonstrated that Nash equilibrium does not even uniquely predict the
outcome in the linear case I skip the static analysis and present only the result under UBRD.
As in the previous results there needs to be a strict disincentive for agents to deviate. Since
the outcome space is ﬁnite the usual core deﬁnition does not guarantee this.
12Note that this includes the cases of agents not proﬁting at all from the public good, or who get satiated
at some level.
13A further generalization to diﬀerent endowments for diﬀerent agents only complicates notation. The
mechanism can easily be adjusted by enhancing the message space and all main results would be unaﬀected.
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I therefore need a deﬁnition, which is somewhat stronger than the usual core deﬁnition to
describe the equilibrium outcomes. Possibilities for deviations under indiﬀerence need to be
excluded.
Deﬁnition 5.3 A core allocation z is strict∗ for a subset S ⊂ I of agents if for any en-
forceable outcome z′ of a coalition S ′ with S ′ ∩ S 6= ∅ there exists some agent i ∈ S ′ with
z i z′.
Deﬁnition 5.4 Deﬁne the subset SC(z) ⊂ I via i ∈ SC(z) if and only if fi(
∑n
i=1 zi) > 0 as
the set of agents that strictly beneﬁt from the amount of public good in z.
Theorem 5.5 Assume there exists at least one outcome z that is a core allocation and strict∗
for SC(z). Then an outcome z′ is an outcome of a recurrent class of the CCM under UBRD
if and only if it is a core allocation that is strict∗ for SC(z′).
If no such outcome exists the result would be a cycling behavior of the dynamics. It is
not obvious that the assumption of existence of such an outcome is satisﬁed in all relevant
cases. However, the existence problem only exists on an inﬁnitesimal level. This is shown,
by proving that the mechanism can be adjusted to guarantee existence at arbitrarily low
expected costs.14
In the following theorem let ∆ be a mapping from Z×I → R+. The interpretation is that
the mapping deﬁnes for any agent and any outcome some expected payment ∆(z, i) := δzi
that agent i gets payed if outcome z occurs. I write G + ∆ to describe a mechanism G to
which the additional payments ∆ are added.
Theorem 5.6 For any environment with weakly increasing valuation functions and for any
 > 0 there exists a mapping ∆ such that in the game CCM+∆ there exists a core allocation
z, which is strict∗ for the subset SC(z). Further, the expected cost of ∆ is less than .
14Since costs are arbitrarily low I do not want to argue here who should pay those costs. Note though that
in reality costs for setting any such incentives can never be arbitrarily low since the administration costs will
be strictly positive. However, the theorem is not meant to ﬁx the problem in applications, but rather to show
that the problem is likely to have no eﬀect in real applications at all. Note further that only expected costs
can be arbitrarily low as the assumption of a smallest monetary unit makes arbitrarily low payments only
possible as lotteries.
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6 Summary and discussion
This paper introduces the class of Conditional Contribution Mechanisms for the provision
of public goods. In these mechanisms agents can condition their contribution on the total
contribution of all agents. There are eﬃcient as well as ineﬃcent Nash equilibrium outcomes.
However, under Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics all equilibrium outcomes turn out
to be Pareto eﬃcient, in the non transferable utility sense.
A new concept, Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics, is introduced in the paper to
predict the outcomes of the mechanisms. Although the concept is close to the standard
concept of Better Response Dynamics and the new unexploitability condition can, besides
other arguments, be related to eliminating weakly dominated strategies, there always remains
some doubt as to the predictive power of a new solution concept. Therefore, experiments with
these mechanisms have to be conducted. A ﬁrst experiment with the binary environment
shows that the BCCM signiﬁcantly outperforms the VCM in terms of contribution rates
and Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics is a good predictor for the stable equilibrium
outcomes (Reischmann, 2015).
Good dynamic equilibrium properties combined with ambiguous Nash equilibrium prop-
erties indicate that the mechanism might only be suited for repeated public good problems.
However, there are a lot of possibilities to adjust the mechanism for a one-shot game such that
the dynamic properties are used. As one example the mechanism could be played ﬁve times
with the highest contribution in the ﬁve trials being used as the outcome. This is close to
the way in which the auction mechanism studied by Smith (1979, 1980) makes coordination
possible. Further, agents could be allowed to communicate prior to the one shot game. This
form of cheap talk communication was already used successfully to increase contributions in
a standard VCM public goods game by Isaac et al. (1985). In the VCM agents have a myopic
incentive to lie about the message they intend to send. In the CCM agents do not have such
an incentive to lie, since failed coordination makes everyone worse oﬀ. Thus, communication
should work even better with the CCM. Finding the best way to adjust the mechanism to
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one shot games is an interesting question for further research.
Everything considered, the class of Conditional Contribution Mechanisms is an important
addition to the set of public good mechanisms. It satisﬁes individual rationality, incentive
compatibility, and leads under UBRD to Pareto eﬃcient outcomes in repeated public good
environments. Furthermore, in the ﬁnal analysis the only assumption on valuations is that
they are weakly increasing in the level of the public good. Those weak assumptions make
the mechanism applicable in a wide variety of public good settings.
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Appendix
General notation: In many proofs I have to show that some outcome z is some sort of
equilibrium. In those proofs I need to distinguish between two subsets of agents. The subset
of agents who contribute to the public good in z, shall be called I1 ⊂ I. And the subset
of agents who do not contribute to the public good in z shall be called I0 ⊂ I. If I need a
second outcome z′ in the proof, those sets will be called I ′1 and I
′
0, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 2.2 Let z be an allocation such that no agent strictly prefers z to z
and deﬁne k :=
∑n
i=1 zi. Then the message proﬁle mi = k ∀i ∈ I1,mi = n + 1 ∀i ∈ I0 is
a Nash equilibrium with the desired outcome. It is obvious that gBCCM(m) = z. In the
following I show that m is a Nash equilibrium.
If some agent i in I1 deviates to a message m
′
i < k, the outcome does not change. If he
changes his message to some m′i > k, the new outcome will be z. Since no agent strictly
prefers z to z, this can not make agent i strictly better oﬀ. Thus agents in I1 have no strict
incentive to deviate.
If some agent j in I0 deviates to m
′
j > k + 1, the outcome does not change. If he changes
his message to m′j ≤ k + 1 he will contribute and total contribution will be k + 1. Since
θj ∈ [0, 1) this will make him worse oﬀ. Thus also the agents in I0 have no incentive to
deviate and m is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
Let on the other hand z be an outcome such that any agent i strictly prefers z to z. Let
then m be any message proﬁle leading to the outcome z. By choosing the message m′i = n+1
any outcome that might occur is at least as good for agent i as z. Thus i has an incentive to
deviate. Thus m can not be a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 3.7 I prove the theorem in two steps. In step 1, I show that any
outcome with the described properties is an outcome of a recurrent class of the dynamics. In
step 2, I show that from any other outcome the dynamics reach such a recurrent class with
strictly positive probability.
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Step1: In the discussion of the environment I assumed that there exists some Pareto
improvement z over z, which is strict for all i ∈ I1. Such a Pareto improvement is further
strict for all agents i with θi > 0.
Let z be any such outcome and let k =
∑n
i=1 zi. Then mi = k if and only if i ∈ I1 and
mi = n+ 1 if and only if i ∈ I0 is part of a recurrent class of UBRD with outcome z. I prove
this by checking that no deviation to a diﬀerent outcome is compatible with UBRD.
For any agent i ∈ I1 deviations to any mi = k′ > k will lead to the outcome z. Since z is
a strict Pareto improvement over z for those agents this is not a better response. Deviations
to any mi = k
′ < k make outcomes possible in which i contributes but total contribution
is less than k. Thus those strategies are exploitable. Thus no agent in I1 will change their
message according to UBRD. If only agents in I0 change their messages total contribution
can only increase. No agent i ∈ I0 will choose any mi = k′ < k + 2 since then this agent
i would contribute. Since θi ∈ [0, 1) agent i would be worse oﬀ. Thus this is not a better
response for agent i.
Assume now that after some deviations of agents i ∈ I0 under UBRD the outcome nev-
ertheless changes from z to z′. Since z was Pareto optimal at least one agent, call him j, is
worse oﬀ in z′ than in z. Since we already noted that no agent in I1 has any incentive to
deviate total contributions are higher in z′ than in z. Thus j ∈ I ′1 or agent j could not be
worse oﬀ in z′. This implies that the messages of agent j that made the change from z to z′
possible was exploitable. Thus, j would not have chosen this message under UBRD. And z
is indeed the outcome of a recurrent class of the UBRD process.
Step2: Take now any outcome z ∈ Z which is not Pareto optimal or not a strict Pareto
improvement over z for all i with θi > 0. Then I distinguish two cases. In case 1 z is Pareto
optimal but not a strict Pareto improvement over z for all i with θi > 0. Then there exists
some agent i, who contributes, but would be better oﬀ by or indiﬀerent to not contributing
even if this will lead to z. Thus for this agent mi = n+1 is a (weak) better response. Further
mi = n + 1 can never be exploitable. If all other contributing agents chose unexploitable
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messages the switch to mi = n + 1 will lead to the outcome z. From z the dynamics reach
any recurrent class with Pareto optimal outcome z, which is a strict∗ Pareto improvement
over z, with positive probability. All messages in any such recurrent class are unexploitable
better responses, whenever the current outcome is z.
In case 2 z is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists a Pareto optimal outcome z′, which
is a Pareto improvement over z. Assume that in z′, k′ agents will contribute. Then for
those agents who contribute in z′ but not in z, mi = k′ is an unexploitable better response.
Once all those agents play mi = k
′, the outcome switches to z′. Thus the dynamics reach
z′ with positive probability. Now z′ is either a Pareto optimum which is a strict∗ Pareto
improvement over z, or we are in case 1. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1 Let z := (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Z be an outcome, such that z i z ∀ i ∈ I,
and deﬁne β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi. Then mi = (zi, β¯) is a Nash-equilibrium of the mechanism with
outcome z. There are four ways in which any agent i can deviate from this message. He can
increase or decrease his proposed contribution. And he can increase or decrease his condition.
Any decrease in the oﬀered contribution will fail to satisfy all other agents conditions and
can thus only lead to outcomes, which are worse for agent i, no matter what condition he
choses.
Any (weak) increase in the oﬀered contribution will not lead to an increase of other agents'
contributions. Thus, such an increase combined with a condition that can be satisﬁed will
only lead to a (weakly) higher contribution by agent i. If the increase in the oﬀered condition
is combined with a condition that can not be satisﬁed the outcome will be z. In both cases
agent i is (weakly) worse oﬀ. Thus, no agent has any incentive to deviate and m is a Nash
equilibrium.
Let now z ∈ Z be an outcome such that some agent i strictly prefers z to z. Given any
message proﬁle m′ leading to the outcome z agent i can proﬁtably deviate to m′′i = (0, 0).
This gives him an outcome which is at least as good as z and thus strictly better than z.
Therefore, there is no message proﬁle that makes z a Nash equilibrium outcome.
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Proof of Theorem 4.4 I prove this theorem in two steps. In step 1 I prove that the de-
scribed outcomes are indeed outcomes of recurrent classes of UBRD. And in step 2 I prove
that from any other outcome the dynamics reach one of those recurrent classes with strictly
positive probability.
Step1: In the discussion of the environment I assumed that there exists some Pareto
improvement z over z, which is strict for all i ∈ I1. Take then any Pareto optimal outcome
z′, which is a Pareto improvement over z. Then z′ is a Pareto optimal outcome, which is
strict for all i ∈ I ′1. Assume to the contrary that some i ∈ I ′1 were indiﬀerent between z′ and
z, then his valuation θi must be positive. But then i was either better oﬀ in z than in z
′ if
i ∈ I0, or he was worse oﬀ in z than in z if i ∈ I1. Both possibilities lead to a contradiction.
Note further that any Pareto improvement z over z, which is strict for all i ∈ I1 is further
strict for all agents i with θi > 0.
Thus, there exists a Pareto optimal outcome z ∈ Z, which is a strict Pareto improvement
over z for all agents i with θi > 0. Let z be such an outcome and deﬁne β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi. Then
α1i = α
2
i = zi and β
1
i = β
2
i = β¯ is part of a recurrent class of UBRD with outcome z. Assume
to the contrary that after deviations of some agents consistent with UBRD the outcome
changes from z to some z′ 6= z. Note that z′ 6= z implies in this environment that not all
agents are equally well oﬀ in z′ as in z. Then at least one agent is worse oﬀ in z′ than in z
(otherwise this would be a Pareto improvement over z). If one of the agents who is worse oﬀ
contributes in z′ a strictly positive amount then his message that led to the outcome z′ was
either exploitable or no better response and he would not have chosen it in UBRD. Thus,
all agents, who are worse oﬀ in z′ than in z, need to contribute zero in z′. Assume to the
contrary that in the group of the other agents who are equally well or better oﬀ in z′ than
in z there are some agents who contribute more in z′ than in z. Then it would be a Pareto
improvement over z if those agents made the contributions as in z′, while all other agents
made contributions as in z. This cannot be the case since z was Pareto optimal. Thus, all
agents contribute weakly less in z′ than in z. This implies that total contributions are lower
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in z′ than in z. Then there is one agent in this group whose contribution sank relatively to
the contributions in z by the lowest percentage. If this agent is better oﬀ in z′ than in z he
would still be better oﬀ in z since the valuation of the public good is linear. This contradicts
that z was a strict∗ Pareto improvement over z. This yields a contradiction and thus it is
not possible that the outcome changes under UBRD once the described message proﬁle is
reached.
Step2: Assume now that the current outcome z is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists
a Pareto improvement z′ over z such that z′ is Pareto optimal. Deﬁne again β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi
and β¯′ :=
∑n
i=1 z
′
i. Then for any agent i the message α
1
i = zi, β
1
i = β¯, α
2
i = z
′
i, β
2
i = β¯
′ is
an unexploitable better response to their current message. If all agents choose this message
the outcome will be z′. Thus the dynamics reach this message proﬁle with strictly positive
probability. Once it is reached the new outcome is z′ and now α1i = z
′
i, β
1
i = β¯
′, α2i = z
′
i,
β2i = β¯
′ is an unexploitable better response for all agents. Thus from any not Pareto optimal
outcome a message proﬁle, like the one in the ﬁrst part of this proof, is reached with strictly
positive probability.
If z′ is a strict Pareto improvement over z for all agents i with θi > 0 the proof is complete.
If it is not, then there exists some agent i ∈ I ′1 who is at least as well oﬀ in z as in z′. For this
agent the message α1i = 0, β
1
i = 0, α
2
i = 0, β
2
i = 0 in an unexploitable better response. Thus
the dynamics move from any Pareto optimum like z′ to z with positive probability. From z
any Pareto optimal allocation, which is a strict∗ Pareto improvement over z, is reached with
positive probability in the way described above. 
Proof of Theorem 5.5 In the ﬁrst part of the proof I show that any core outcome z, which
is strict∗ for SC(z), is an outcome of recurrent classes of the dynamics.
Let z be an outcome of the mechanism and let z be a core allocation, which is strict* for
SC(z). Deﬁne β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi. Then α
1
i = α
2
i = zi and β
1
i = β
2
i = β¯ is part of a recurrent
class of UBRD with outcome z. Assume to the contrary that after deviations of some agents
consistent with UBRD the outcome changes to some z′ 6= z. Then at least one agent i ∈ I ′1
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is worse oﬀ in z′ than in z (otherwise this would be a coalition improvement over z). Agent
i's message, which led to the outcome z′, was thus either exploitable or no better response
and he would not have chosen it in UBRD.
In the second part of the proof I show that from all other allocations the dynamics move
with strictly positive probability to a core allocation, which is strict∗ for SC(z).
Assume that the dynamics are in a state with some outcome z, which is not Pareto optimal
and let z′ be any Pareto optimal allocation, which is a Pareto improvement over z. Deﬁne
β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi and β¯
′ :=
∑n
i=1 z
′
i. Then the message (zi, β¯), (z
′
i, β¯
′) is an unexploitable better
response for any agent i. Thus the dynamics move with strictly positive probability from z
to any such z′.
I can thus assume that the dynamics are in a state with some outcome z, which is Pareto
optimal, but not a core outcome that is strict for SC(z). Then there exists a coalition S
and an outcome z′ ∈ ZS such that all agents i ∈ I ′1 are at least as well oﬀ in z′ than in
z. This implies that β¯′ :=
∑n
i=1 z
′
i < β¯ :=
∑n
i=1 zi or this would be a Pareto improvement.
Then in a ﬁrst step the messages (zi, β¯), (z
′
i, β¯
′) are unexploitable better responses for every
agent i ∈ I ′1. Once all agents i ∈ I ′1 switched to those messages, the messages (z′i, β¯′), (z′i, β¯′)
and (zi, β¯), (zi, β¯) are both unexploitable better responses for those agents, since the current
outcome is still z. But if now simultaneously one agent chooses (z′i, β¯
′), (z′i, β¯
′) and another
one chooses (zj, β¯), (zj, β¯), then contribution breaks down entirely and the outcome will be
z. From z any core allocation, which is a Pareto improvement over z and strict∗ for SC(z)
will be reached with strictly positive probability in the way described above. 
Proof of theorem 5.6 I prove this theorem in two steps. In step 1, I show that it is possible
to design arbitrarily cheap incentive schemes, such that no agent is indiﬀerent between any
two outcomes. In step 2, I show that this leads to the existence of a core outcome in the given
environment. Finally, when every agent has a strict preference between any two outcomes
then any core outcome is strict∗ for all subsets of agents. Thus, there exists a core outcome
z, which is strict for SC(z).
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Step 1: Let  > 0. Deﬁne ′ := mini∈I minz,z′∈Z:ui(z) 6=ui(z′) |ui(z) − ui(z′)| as the smallest
positive diﬀerence in utility between any two outcomes for any agent. Let NZ := #Z be the
number of possible outcomes and let r : Z → {1, ..., NZ} be any bijective mapping, which
satisﬁes
∑n
i=1 zi >
∑n
i=1 z
′
i ⇒ r(z) > r(z′). Deﬁne the mapping ∆zi = r(z)min(,
′)
2nNZ
∀ i ∈ I.
Total cost of this mapping can be estimated in the following way:
n∑
i
∆zi =
n∑
i
r(z) min(, ′)
2nNZ
≤
n∑
i
NZ min(, 
′)
2nNZ
≤ nmin(, 
′)
2n
≤ 
2
(7)
Thus the mapping has total cost of at most 
2
. Assume now to the contrary that some agent
i is indiﬀerent between any two outcomes z and z′ under the mechanism with the incentive
scheme ∆. This indiﬀerence implies:
ui(z) + ∆zi = ui(z
′) + ∆z′i ⇔ ui(z)− ui(z′) = ∆z′i −∆zi (8)
The absolute value of the left-hand side of this equation is either equal to zero or weakly
bigger than ′. However, since r(z) 6= r(z′) the absolute value of the right-hand side is strictly
bigger than zero and strictly smaller than ′. This leads to a contradiction. Therefore, adding
the incentive scheme ∆ leads to a mechanism in which no agent is indiﬀerent between any
two outcomes.
Step 2: I prove this step by induction over the number of agents in the economy. For the
beginning assume there are n = 1 agents. Then existence of a core outcome is equivalent
to the existence of an outcome which gives the agent maximal utility. Since our state space
is ﬁnite this is trivial. Thus, one may assume that for an economy with n = k agents
there exists a core outcome. Let's now look at an economy with n = k + 1 agents. Call
the coalition of agents 1 through k in this economy C. Then by assumption there is an
outcome z, with zk+1 = 0, from which no subcoalition of C can improve. I call this a core
outcome in the coalition C. Let z′ be the Pareto optimal Pareto improvement over z, in
which agent k + 1 gets the highest utility. Then no subcoalition of C can improve on z′.
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Otherwise z could not have been a core outcome in coalition C. Assume to the contrary
a coalition C ′ including agent k + 1 can improve from z′ to an outcome z′′. Then total
contributions are less in z′′ than in z′ or this would be a further Pareto improvement. Then
z′′′ := (max{z1, z′′1}, ...,max{zk, z′′k}, z′′k+1) is a Pareto improvement over z in which agent k+1
is better oﬀ than in z′′ (since
∑n
i=1 zi >
∑n
i=1 z
′
i ⇒ r(z) > r(z′)) and thus better oﬀ than
in z′. This contradicts the assumptions on z′. Thus, no coalition can improve on z′ and
therefore z′ is in the core.
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